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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MAUD D. COON and JOSEPH COON,
husband and wife,
Appellants,
Case No. 7470

vs.
UTAH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a corporation,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELATING TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO STRIKE TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD AND ARGUMENT THEREON.
The defendant and respondent, Utah Construction
Company, has served and filed herein its motion· to
strike appellant's transcript of official record because
it was not settled or filed as provided by law. A copy
of the motion is included in the brief as Appendix A.
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The record sho'~'s that the findings of f,act and
conclusions of law and judgment were signed and
filed on June 8, 1949. On July 8, 1949, the plaintiff
served and filed a motion for new trial. On September
6, 1949, the court made and entered its order as follows:
''Upon the motion of Grover A. Giles, counsel
for the plaintiffs and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that the plaintiffs' motion for
new trial be, and the same is hereby denied.''
It is respondent's contention that since the motion
, for new trial was denied upon the motion of Grover
A. Giles, counsel for plaintiffs, that it was not neoes.s·ary for the defendant to serve notice of overruling
of the motion for new trial in order to start the time
running within which the· appellant must prepare,
serve and file the bill of exceptions.
On November 26, 1949, the appellant served, and
on November 28, filed their notice of appeal. On December 17 an order was made and entered extending
. the_ appellant's time from December 26, 1949, to J anuary 26, 1950. On January 21, 1950, appellant, proceeding under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
served a designation of record on appeal and proceeded upon the theory that the rules of civil pro.cedure made unnecessary the a;>·erfecting of the appeal
under the old statute which included the serving and
filing and settling of a bill of exceptions.
Respondent does not take issue with appellant's
theory that since January 1, 1950, bills of excep~tion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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have been m:a.de unnecessary 1n the nevv appellate
procedure. It is, ho,veYer, respondent's contention and
position that the rules of procedure vvere not effective
prior to January 1, 1950, and that since the time for
appellant to ;prepare, serYe and file a bill of exceptions had expired on October 6, 1949, 'vhich vvas
thirty days :after the motion for new trial was overruled ~"pon r~otion of appellant's- attorney, that neither
the notice of appeal thereafter served nor the rules
of ciril procedure thereafter adopted could revive the
bill of exceptions by calling it a designation of record
on appeal or by :a.ny other n1eans. It was not the
intention of the Supreme Court in adopt~ng the Utah
rules of civil procedure to make it possible for an
appellant, whose time to prepare, serve and file a·
bill of exception& under the procedure theretofore
existing had expired, and who had served and filed a
notice of appeal prior to the_ effective date of the
new rules, to file a designation of record on ap1peal
under the new rules and thereby cure a fatal defect
in the procedure required for the filing of a bill of
exceptions under the former practice .

.

Rule 75(a) with respect to designation of contents of
record on appeal provides :
''Within ten days after the filing of the
notice of appeal, the appellant shall serve upon
the respondent and file with the District Court
a designation of the portion of the record.
proceedings, and evidence to be contained in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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record of appeal unless the res:pondent has
already served and filed a designation.''
Appellant's notice of appeal was served and filed
on November 28, 1949, and the designation of· contents of record was not served and filed ·within ten
days of that date.
It is our position simply stated that the time to
serve and fi~e the bill of exceptions expired on October
6, 1949, which was thirty days after the motion for
new trial was overruled upon motion of appellant's
own attorney. The thirty-day period was not started
·anew under the Utah cases by the appellant's thereafter serving and filing the notice of appeal.
Rule 1 provides that the rules govern all proceedings brought after they take effect and ;all proceedings in actions then pending except to the extent
that in the opinion of the court the wpplication in a
particular .action pending when the rules take ~ffect,
would not be feasible or would work injustice, in
which event the former procedure applies. If appellant asserts that the new rules apply his designation of record is ineffective because it was not filed
within ten days after the filing of notice of appeal.
While there is no Utah precedent on the point, the
language of rule 1 quoted ahove seems to definitely
(Provide· that where the appellant was in no position
to file a designation of the record within ten days
from the date of ap.peal, that he should have continued the method of perfecting his appeal under the
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old statutes and should have had a bill of exceptions
serYed, filed and settled within the time provided by law.
In Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320; 145 Pac.
1036, the court held that" the plaintiff's bill of exceptions should be stricken. The records sho'v that the
judgment "'"as filed and entered January 28, 1914,
and on May 25, 1914, plaintiff's counsel served notiee
of the decision upon defendant's counsel. Defendant's
counsel signified his intention to appeal and incorpo- rated into their bill of exceptions only so much of the·
proceedings as they deemed_ material to their ap.peal.
Plaintiff had obtained an extension of time to prepare
and settle the bill to May 20, 1914. The bill of the
plaintiff was settled on June 25. · Plaintiff contended
that this was within time because he was entitled
to notice of the decision from defendant's counsel and
that since no notice was served upon him that the
time within which to prepare and serve a proposed
bill of exceptions had not commenced to run when
his proposed bill was in fact served. Holding that the
~plaintiff was in error in this contention, our court said:
"To hold that the Legislature intended that
both parties must serve and are entitled to notice
of the en try of a decision in a p·articular case
is to hold that it intended something unreasonable, if not -absurd. The whole purpose of- the
statute is to give the aggrieved party who may
intend to appeal, sufficient time within which
to prepare and serve his proposed bill of exceptions, in which either all or so much of the rproceedings of the trial court may be, set forth as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1nay be deemed necessary to such appeal. The
notice provided for in the section is intended to
set the time in motion within which the proposed
bill of exceptions must be prepared and served.
Now, is it reasonable to suppose that the party
who prepares and serves the notice, which must
contain a ·statement of the time that the decision was filed, is entitled to a further notice of
what he must be conclusively presumed to know~
Is not the notice which he 1lrepares and serves
upon his adversary also notice to him of what
it contains~ Why should it be held to impart
notice to the person up~on whom served but not
upon him who is required to prepare and serve
it~ As already intimated, to so hold would, in
our judgment, lead to an absurdity. Under all
of our holdings, therefore, the court was without power to settle and allow plaintiff's ~proposed
bill of exceptions and therefore we cannot consider it for any purpose.''
If notice served by the p~laintiff on the defendant
1n the above cited case is also notice to the plaintiff
of the entry of judgment it would seem absurd and
an unnecessary requirement to say that where plaintiff's own counsel has himself moved that this motion
for new trial be overruled and if such is the ruling
in open court and in the presence of plaintiff's counsel that he must nevertheless he served with written
notice of overruling of his motion for new trial in
order to start running the time within which a bill
of exceptions must .be served and filed, it would
result in a holding by the court that notice must be
given to the attorney "\\rho was the only one as shown
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by the record "·ho \Yas present 111 court \Vhen his
motion for ne\Y trial \Vas overruled, and apparently
the only one \vho kne\v that it \Vas overruled because
as shown by the record defendant's counsel proceeded
to have it overruled again \vithout kno\Yledge that
it had been thereto£ ore denied.
In Cody r. Cody, 47 Utah 456; 154 Pac. 952, it
appeared that the .plaintiff obtained a decree of divorce
on Kovember 6, 1913. On June 19, 1914, 1nore than
six months after the entry of judgment, the plaintiff
appealed from the interlocutory decree entered on
November 6, 1913. Plaintiff's counsel contended that
his appeal \vas in time because no notice of original
decision \Yas served upon plaintiff, as to this contention the court said and held:
''As to the first p-roposition, we remark that
the record is conclusive that the decree as entered
was entirely in favor of the rplaintiff and that
the same was prepared by her attorneys. Surely
the statute requiring notice of a decision in order
to set in motion the time for serving and filing
a notice of motion for a new trial was not
intended to apply to the party in whose favor
the decision was given, when that party has prepared the findings and conclusions, and decree,
must of necessity, as pointed out by us in Jensen
v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145 Pac. 1036, be
deemed to have notice of the decision, and hence
is not entitled to further notice thereof. The
plaintiff, -therefore, was not entitled to notice
of the decision in the divorce proceedings, 'and
hence her notice of motion for a new trial was
not filed within the time required by our statute,
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and it therefore could not be used as a means to
extend the time within which to take an appeal.''
If these cases make it clear, as we submit they do,
that the plaintiff was not entitled to notice of overruling of the motion for a new trial when it was
overruled upon his motion and as shown by the
record in the absence of counsel for defendant, then
it is clear that the· time within which a bill of exceptions s~ould have been prepared, served and filed
commenced to run on Se'Ptember 6, 1949.
The remaining question is whether or not the
notice of appeal served on N ovemher 26, and filed
on November 28 gave plaintiff a new and additional
thirty days commencing on November 28, during which
he could file his bill of exceptions~ Section 104-39-4
1n subdivision 2, p~rovides :
''In case 'an ap~eal is taken before the bill
of exceptions is settled, service of the notices
aforesaid shall not be necessary and tim·e shall
run from service of his notice of appeal. ''
This provision of the statute was analyzed in Findlay
v. National Union Indemnity ·Co., 85 Utah 110; 38 Pac.
(2d) 760. The court held the appeal method of starting the time to run ''is applicable only when time has
not already started to run either by notice or by
the provisions of the statute without notice.'' (Page
122· of 85 Utah.)
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In that case it appeared that the plaintiff had
judgn1ent on his Yerdirt and a motion for a new trial
was denied on ~larch 15, 1932. Notice of denial of
the motion was served on the 16th and filed on the
17th of ~larch, 1932. Notice of appeal to the Supreme
Court \Yas serYed and filed on the 2nd of April, 1932.
On April 29, 1932, the District Court entered an order
granting the defendant -and appellant sixty days frorn
the 1st day of ~lay, 1932, in which to serve, settle
and file the bill of exceptions. Respondent filed a
motion to strike the bill of exceptions on the theory
that the notice of denial- of Inotion for new trial
started the time within which the hill should have
been prepared running on March 17, 1932 and that
the time expired at the end of thirty days. In holding that the filing of the notice of appeal did notstart a new thirty-day period but was ap1plicable only
when the time had not already been started by some
other method, the court said :
''When the time limitation fixed by the statute has been started running by any one of the
methods provided by the statu.te, except by notice
of appeal, may such time as has ·elapsed be cut
off and the time st-arted to run -anew and from
the date of the service of notice of appeal~ We
think it was neither the purpose of the statute
nor the intention of the Legislature in making
the amendment to thus permit an extension of
time when once started as •provided by the st-atute: 'In case an appe-al is taken before the bill
of exceptions is settled service of the notices
afores-aid shall not be necessary' to start the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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time running within which to prepare and serve
the bill of ·exceptions. When the time has once
been started by the service of the required notice,
it may no more be cut off by serving and filing
a subsequent notice of appeal than the time could
be similarly cut off in case of entry of judgment on a verdict where no notice is necessary
in the absence of a motion for a new trial. The
appeal method of starting the time to run is
applicable only when time has not already been
started to run either by notice or by the provision of the statute without notice.''
It therefore appears clear that since the· action of
plaintiff's counsel in making the motion in open court
that the motion for a new trial theretofore filed by the
plaintiff should be denied is the equivalent of notice
of denial upon that date and that plaintiff cannot
thereafter assert that he is entitled to such written
notice, and that the time within which the bill of
exceptions in this case should have been prepared
and filed commenced to run on September ·6, 1949, and
expired on October 6, 1949, and that since that time
had eXJpired when the new rule became effective
appellant's effort to have the evidence in the case
placed in the record in form of a . designation of
record on a.pp.eal under the new civil rules is abortive
and that the court should strike the purported transcript of official record and consider the appeal only
on the judgment roll.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

II.

ST.A.TE~IENT

OF THE FACTS UPON
THE l\IERITS OF THE CASE.

The case belo"~ \Yas tried ~o the court sitting
without a jury. The court made findings and conclusions and judgment in fayor of Utah Construction
Company. The only question before this court is
"'"hether the findings and judgment are supported by
the record. The .a1ppellant alleges as error the court's
conclusions of law number one, t\vo and three and
that .the. judgment for defendant is erroneous. No
errors are alleged relating to the admission or exchision of testimony. Appellant does not claim that the
findings· of fact are not sup·ported by the testimony.
Appellants own a farm on 33rd South .Street at
80th West. Eightieth West Street, which is a public
county road, extends south from the tailings .pond
of Kennecott Copper Corporation. The respondent
used this public highway to haul gravel from a pit
south of appellant's farm to the tailings pond which
is north of appellant's f.arm, to reinforce the earth
bank. This suit involves only a period of approximately
seven months of use commencing in July, 1948.

In order to clarify the issue before this court it
I

IS

proper to ask what facts are controlling in this

case. We wish to emphasize .at the outset that we
will not contend the trucks of respondent did not
make any noise or dust. There are two fundamental
reasons why the judgment of the trial court should
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
be sustained. First the record shows that the use of
the highway was a proper and lawful use different
only in degree from the use of highway by other
users. The record shows there w~a.s an increased use
and volume of traffic with the resulting increase in
all the burdens sustained by those who live on such
~ highway-noise and dust and verhap~s some fumes.
Second, the appellant's suit is based on the theory
of a nuisance and the measure of damages is the
depreciation in the market value of his farm. There
is ·no evidence in the record that his farm has depreciated in market value in any sum. There is no testimony showing the sale or rental v;alue before or after
-the operation of the trucks of respondent. The court
could not make a finding that the appellant had sustained one dollar in damages by reason of the defendant's use of the public highway. The loss of sale value
or rental value must be based on direct testimony.
The record shows that the plaintiff had filed a
prior suit against the same defendant in which he had
alleged that in a prior period the Utah Construction
Company had dam·aged his home because of the O!peration of its trucks on the public highway. On October
16, 1946, the former case was settled and the plaintiff
received $3,000 and signed a release in full for all
damages theretofore sustained. (Exhibit 17) Respondent introduced the complaint and release not as a bar
to the present suit between the sanie parties but to
·show that according to plaintiff's sworn complaint
the cracks in his house were there when the respondent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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commenced its truck operations in July, 1948. Appellant could not reeoYer t"'"ice for the eracks he alleged
'Yere caused prior to October 16, 1946. He had the
burden of proving the extent in dollars of the darnage (depreciation in market value), if any, which
resulted from the second hauling period. There was .
testimony that the old cracks had opened up worse but
no attempt \Yas made to show depreciation in market
value caused by the second !period of operation as distinguished from the prior period which was settled.
This is a law case, being an action for damages to
real estate. The defendant in the court below had
no burden of proof to discharge and it is accurate
to state that the judgment of the trial court must
stand unless the evidence in support of plaintiffs'
theory of the case is so convincing that to fail to
find in £a.vor of the plaintiff would be arbitrary and
capricious. The Supreme Court in this case does not
have the obligation nor the power to weigh the evidence as it . would in an equity case and constitute
itself a body to find the facts from the preponderance
of the weight of the testimony, but it is only concerned
with the question of whether there is sufficient testimony in the record so that a finding for the defendant
upon the issues involved would not be arbitrary without sup·port in the testimony.
It therefore becomes useful to examine the testimony produced on behalf of defendant. J. Melvin
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Paulson testified that he was superintendent of the
Utah Construction Company and had started to work
on the job in question on F·ebruary 1, 1945. What
has been referred to as the first job started D·ecember
28, 1944, and lasted about three months (R. 167).
The second job, or the one involved in this lawsuit,
commenced the 26th of July, 1948, and ended
after seven months (R. 65). The trucks started running at five o'clock in the morning and ran until
eleven o'clock P.M., with thirty minutes out on each
shift for lunch. Drivers were changed at two o'clock
in the afternoon. The gross load is from 81,000 to
84,000 pounds. They had six pneumatic tires, and
Exhibit 12, which is a photograph, shows one of the
larger u.nits. The tires are about five feet in diameter
and about fourteen inches across the face of the
tire. There would be a trn·ck passing a given point
in one direction or the other app.roximately every three
minutes (R. 170). Delays frequently occurred resulting
from break-downs.
''A. Prior to the beginning of our operation
in July of 1948 we oiled the road and ~ut a coat
of slag from the smelter on top of the oil coat
to reduce the dust and to sink into the oil. As
time went on and some dust perhaps accumulated
on the road we used ~a sp·rinkler truck to operate
back and forth, up and down 80th West constantly." (R. 171).
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The attention of the 'vitness was called to Exhibit
5, and he then testified .as follows :
'' Q. Did you observe that house or that part
of the house or crack prior to July 26 in 1948,
in the year 1948 '?

"A. At ~Ir. Coon's request I went in and
looked at the condition of his home in the spring
of 1945 and he called this particular corner to
my attention, stating he had plastered that up
in October of 1944 and showed me that there
was an additional crack that had developed after
it had been plastered.

"Q.
in

This is what he told you at what time

1945~

''A. This was in the spring of 1945, either
the last of March or early in April.

"Q. That was at the end of what you call
the first job, approximately that~
''A. Yes sir, yes sir." (R. 178-179)
At page 135 of the record the witness who had
testified that the crack shown in Exhibit 5 was in the
house in 1945 and testified that he S'aw it agam 1n
1948 when the second job was in ~progress, testified:
Did you observe this corner of the house~
''A. I did from the roadway.
"Q. And did you observe it at intervals
after that~
''A. Yes sir.
''Q. Now do you have any opinion as to
whether or not there is any change in that from
'' Q.
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the time that you first saw it in 1945 until the
present time~
''A. I don't think there is any change whatsoever.'' ( R. 180-181)
Mr. Paulson further testified that the horsepower
of the diesel motors used in the Euclid trucks was
150 horsepower and that the commercial transports
used on highways generally have h~rsepower ranging
from 150 to 275.
With respect to the dust we find the following
at page 140 of the transcript:
And why was it necessary a little later
to put a sprinkler on an oiled road?
'' Q.

''A. With the hauling equipment and the
travel of the public there was- a little dust accumulated on the road and knowing the attitude of
the people on 80th West we made it a special
point to not only oil the road but to sprinkle
it frequently to keep down the dust and there
was no dust.
'' Q.

There wasn't any dust at

all~

"A. No sir.

"Q. Not at any

time~

''A. Not ·at any time except perhaps when
we would have a hot, dry spell.'' (R. 185-186)
Two sprinklers were available for sprinkling the
road so that one or the other of the trucks was operating constantly, day and night, except when there was
rain. (R. 188)
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,,. . ith respect to the alleged damage to the house
resulting fron1 Yibration caused by 1noving of the
trucks on the high,Yay, l\lr. Paulson testified at :page
150 of the transcript :

"Q. And is it your testimony that this vibration of those trucks didn't do any damage to
the house'
"A. Yes sir.''

* * * * *
"Q. Now I ask you upon what ·you base
your conclusion'
''A. I don't think the trucks would cause
any damage from vibration.'' (R. 195)
On cross-examination Mr. Paulson "\Vas asked:
"Q. v\'hat caused the

cracks~

''A.

Old age and settlement.

"Q.

This is a brick house, is it not' -

''A. Insufficient foundation. ' '

* * * * *
"Q. And when did you see it

before~

''A. 1945.

"Q. That wa·s when you were operating your
trucks'
''A. We h-ad finished the operation at that
time.

''Q. But there had been operation for three
months when you saw the house'
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''A. That is correct, but Mr. Coon showed
1ne the crack in this pillar in the spring of '45
and said he had plastered that three-quarter-inch
crack up in October of '44." (R. 196-197)
Mr. Percival Young, a general contractor who had
made a special study of causes of cracking in houses,
when sho,vn Exhibit 5, testified:
·"A. That is a picture taken of the southeast
corner, near the enclosed porch and in the general direction of north and west and that picture
was taken to show the crack at that point~

'' Q. And will you describe for the record
the nature of that crack~
''A. That is what we normally term :a settlement crack occurring at the corner of the house.

'' Q. Would you have an opinion as to how
long it has taken that crack to develop~
''A. Oh, I would say that that crack has
been in there for as much as twenty years."

* * * * *
"A. This house at this point has no basement
under it. It has no gutters on the edge of the
roof and it has been my exi>erience that as the
water runs off the roof it collects 'and seeps along
the foundation walls. If the walls aren't deep
enough and if the footings aren't wide enough
it develops a spongy eondition and causes settlement.''

* * * * *
..

'' Q. Is it the general rule or is it the exception to find houses with cracks in them~
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" . .\. I have never yet seen a. house without
cracks in it."

* * * •

*

"Q. Does that Exhibit or the previous Exhibit, "\Yhich you haYe identified Or diSCUSSed, in
your opinion sho'v any damage vvhich resulted
from vibration~
I have never been able to recognize
damage from vibration.
' '.L\.

''Q. You mean in that

house~

"A. Not in this house." (R. 210-214)
Examining Exhibit 6, the witness Young testified:

'' Q. The porch slab that is like a concrete
sidewalk that is placed on dirt fill in order to
bring the porch level up to approximately the
main level of the house. It is like a concrete sidewalk setting on this dirt fill. After the brickwork is com:pleted it is pou:red against the brickwork.''

• * * * *
''A. Now these cracks of this nature we
term as shrinkage cracks. Whenever you build
-anything from concrete as the concrete cures or
takes its set it shrinks. That is the reason we
put expansion joints in sidewalks and I have
never read a specification for a building which
didn't say that wherever a concrete slab or any
other concrete material is put that an expansion
joint must be placed there. Now if a person
doesn't want an unsightly joint in a place like
that the only way I know of to correct it is to
cast it against an expansion joint and I am quite
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positive this is what we term a shrinkage crack
in the concrete. I cover in my opinion the crack
in the porch slab. The other crack, that vertical
crack, I have described as a crack five-eighths of
an inch wide maximum. That would be at the
maximum .point between bricks, and here is a
structure some forty-six feet long, north and
south, and as I remember about thirty feet wide,
east and west. From the high temperatures in
the summer to the cold tem:peratures in the
winter there is quite a variation; some movement due to expansion and contraction. We generally term this ·a.s an expansion crack. The reason it occurred at that point is that this concrete
block wall terminated at this point -and is not
bonded or tied in to the brick. Nor was there
b-ond in these three courses of brick above.''

* * * • *
- '' Q. In your opinion, did the cracks that you
have identified and discussed in this Exhibit
result from vibration~
"A.

No." (R. 214-216)

Mr. Mervin B. Hogan, Professor of Engineering
at the University of Utah, who holds a Doctor of
Philosophy Degree from the University of Michigan
(19~6), testified as an expert witness on behalf of
the defendant. He was employed by the defendant in
April, 1948, to scientifically measure the claimed vibration in the plaintiff's house, as well as the noise
resulting from the defendant's operation on the highway. On April 17, 1948, the defendant op·erated its
Euclid trucks, both loaded and empty, just as they
vvere operated during the 1period of time involved in
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the la,vsuit, in order to enable 1\lr. Hogan to measure
the noise and rlaimed Yibration. 1\Ir. Paulson at page
~~1 of the record testified that he \Yas present at
these tests, and the same trucks \Yere loaded with
substantially the SHine loads and operated at a Speed
of not to exceed ~0 m.p.h. loaded, or 25 m.p.h. empty,
and that during· the regular operations the drivers
were instructed to travel at that speed and were
checked by the Assistant Sup·erintendent, Job Foreman, or Safety Engineer at different intervals.
The instrument used by Professor Hogan to measure vibration is called a falling pin seisomometer,
·which consists of a perfectly horizontal 'piece of glass,
upon which are placed six rods one-fourth inch in
diameter. The rods stand perpendicularly on their
ends and are from 6 to 15 inches in length, and
machined square on the ends. If vibration causes
disturbance of the glass base on which they are standing, they will sway or fall over within a tube which
is one and one-eighth inches in diameter and acts as
a compartment for the rod so that one falling rod
will not disturb other rods. It is .a well recognized,
practical instrument for the purpose of measuring
vibrations, resulting from heavy traffic (R. 197).
The instrument was first set up on the west side of
the highway (80th West) a little south and east of the
Coon's residence, and as the Euclid_s passed back and
forth, ''there was no discernible disturbance whatever
indicated by the instrument.'' The instr?ment was
next set up on the back porch of Mr. Coon's home
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in the presence of and with Mr. Coon's consent. There
was again no disturbance. "However, it was observed
by all of us that anyone 'valking on the floor would
cause those jpins to be disturbed" (R. 244). The pins'
did not tip over, but they wobbled on their base. At
Mr. Coon's suggestion, the instrument was then placed
on the table inside the kitchen with exactly the same
results. "There was no evidence of any disturbance
as the trucks went by.'' It was noticed, however, that
when Mr. Coon's little grandchild walked .around on
the floor these pins were obviously wobbling (R. 244).
At Mr. Coon's suggestion, the instrument was then
placed on the table in the dining room.
''So I set the instrument up again and observed it as the Euclids went by and the 12inch pin, I believe it was, again slightly quivered.
It was an ~xtremely questionable ·obs·ervation. I
give it the benefit of the doubt and say it
quivered slightly. Again that could .have been
attributed just as easily to one of us moving his
foot slightly on the floor as to any ·extra disturbance." (R. 247)
On December 16, 1948, which was within the period
of the regular operation of the defendant, Professor
Hogan made measurements of sound at the Coon
home when the trucks were operating, by using a
Type 759-B Sound Level Meter (R. 248). ''This is
an electronic device constructed and standardized, recognized by the American Standards Association as to
its construction and it is the nationally used instrument
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for n1aking sound leYel readings'' (R. 248) The instruInent ha.s a scale 'vhich is calibrated from zero to one
hundred decibels. The instrun1ent was set up at 35th
South and 80th "\\;est, and 25 feet "\Vest of the center
line of 80th \Vest, 'vhich is on the highway joining
the home of ~Ir. Coon, and on which the trucks were
operating.
"I observed six Euclid trucks going south,
upgrade, 'vith a mean reading of 90 decibels
and maximum reading of 99.5 decibels. The
numerical average is 94.9 for those six
Euclids going south upgrade. While there I observed three commercial vehicles or ordinary passenger cars going along 35th South. Again just
for comparison's sake a commercial truck going
east with a reading of 91 decibels; a passenger
car going east, 78 ; a commercial truck with a
reading of 88 going east. The mean reading of
the three being 86.3 decibels." (R. 251)
For further comparison, Professor Hogan took the
instrument out on State Street, opposite the American
Smelting & Refining Company 1plant, which seemed
to him to afford a typical e~ample of ordinary county
highway .traffic.
'' . . . The northbound traffic ranged from a
minimum of 72 to a maximum ·of 89, with a
numerical mean of 81 decibels. The southbound
traffic had a minimum of 66 decibels and a maximum of 82, the numerical mean being 73. I would
like to make it clear that at this point I .am on
the east side of the highway. Southbound traffic
is removed from the instrument considerably
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farther than the northbound which ·of course
accounts for the difference there in the two readings or the mean readings. While at that particular spot I observed several heavier trucks particularly. There was a snow vlow going southbound that gave a decibel reading of 85 ; a diesel
truck that gave a reading of 86 going south.
Another one s-outhbQund making a reading of
90; a heavy commercial truck which read 93;
the mean of that ordinary heavier traffic being
88.5. Then I moved farther south on State Street
to 5300, right at the marker indicating the south
reading of 53 rd. I was ten feet west· of the pavement edge. There is a mile upgrade for the
southbound traffic there I felt possibly simulated the grade going south, or to the east of
Mr. Coon's home. I made six readings of trucks
there. The minimum was 79, the maximum was
86, with a mean of 83.5. I read six passenger
cars, those likewise with a minimum of 69 and
a maximum of 75, with a mean of 72.7 decibels.
That should, I feel,. give a very satisfactory
check on the county traffic so as to offer some
information. Regarding the city commercial
traffic I took the instrument to Second West and
9th South Streets where, as we all know, a good
deal of commercial traffic p·asses. I made a
reading of a traction bus at that intersection of
74 decibels ; a diesel truck at 75 decibels; a heavy
truck 88 decibels, with a mean ·of 82.3 decibels
at that particular point. In order to check a
little further I took the instrument out 'at 1199
Beck Street, which is the Second West highway
going north and the address is that of the
State Highway Commission storage shed and
supply station on the west side of ·the street.
I set the instrument up alongside the fence there
on the west side of the highw·ay, thirty-five feet
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from the center line of the highway. I made
readings of the southbound traffic going into
the city. There is a slight grade there 'and I
observed that ordinary passenger cars ranged
from 68 to 78 decibels at that vicinity, with a
mean of 75.

'' Q. Excuse me. Were you on the west side
of the highway¥
''A. The west side of the highway, yes sir.
"THE COURT : A mean of what¥
''A. A mean of 75 decibels. I observed an
oil truck-its reading was 84; another oil truck
85; a diesel truck 87 decibels. A P .I.E. truck
that exceeded a hundred; a P.I.E._ truck 91 and
a P .I.E. truck 87; an oil tanker 97; a traction
bus, ordinary traction bus 89. Another traction
bus 84 and a heavy truck 84. The mean of those
is 89. Those constitute the data that I obtained
with the sound level instrument on this test of December 16th." (R. 252-3-4)
It was Professor Hogan's conclusion:
'' ... If any one of the six pins remain standing we would say there has not been potentially
damaging vibration in evidence.''
III. ARGUMENT UPON THE MERITS.
(A) AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE EVIDENCE FAILED
TO SHOW APPELLANTS HAD ANY CAUSE OF ACTION.

It is significant that appellant's brief · does not
contain any cases similar in its facts to the case at
bar. Stripped of non-essentials appellant claims he
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is entitled to damages because the use of the public
highway annoys and disturbs the appellant. The appellant in his brief does not contend that the construction company was negligent in any of its operations
or that the appellant's rights of ingress or egress
were violated by the construction company. While the
appellant does not abandon his claim of damage to
his. house by means of vibration from the trucks, the
Trial Judge found that the appellant did not sustain
any physical damage to his real or personal property
as a result of respondent's oper~ations,
'' . . . the cause of such cracks and moving
out of line has been the settling and sinking of
said foundation and has been caused by the natural elements and the passing of years and is
not the result of the operations of the defendant's
Euclid trucks in whole or in part.''
The evidence in the record sustains this finding
of fact so the case must be examined from the original
proposition, viz., did the operations of respondent's
trucks which admittedly caused some noise and fumes
and dust incident to careful truck operation create
in appellant a cause of action for damages to his real
·estate~ The record shows the horsepower of the diesel
engines used in the trucks operated by respondent was
150 H.P. Commercial vehicles on the highway hauling
heavy loads frequently use 250 H.P. diesel engines.
The noise of the trucks here involved is about the
same as heavy duty trucks on the main highways
where Mr. Hogan made the measurements of the noise
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in decibels. Ordinary motor cars or trucks had average
decibel readings near the Coon residence of 86.3 decibels
(R. :251). The average for _the trucks of defendant
was 94.9 decibels. Frequent passage of cars and trucks
makes a noise \vhether they are operated by the
respondent or other travelers on the highway. The
passage of a truck every 2¥2 minutes would mean
that only 12 trucks go north and 12 trucks go south
in an hour. Certainly that is not "heavy traffic"
when compared with the volume of traffic which passes
on any of our main busy highways leading from any
of the larger cities of the state. . The record, when
supplemented by matters of common knowledge of
which this eourt takes judicial notice, supports the
inference that there are many hundreds of miles of
highway in this state which are noisier than the one
on which Mr. Coon lives-both in volume of sound
and continuity of sound. The Euclid trucks of respondent were out of use from 11 P.M. to 5 A.M. whereas
our busy highways are in use day and night. It is
not difficult to understand why there are no cases
where recovery was allowed against one who used
the public highway for the purpose and in the manner
it was intended to be used. Such a fact situation simply
does not spell out a cause of action.
Another reason why such cases have not shown
up in the courts is becaus·e the state and its subdivisions have pre-empted the field of highway and
motor vehicle regulation and control. An early (1905)
California case tested the validity of an ordinance of
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Marin County which made it a crime to operate an
automobile between sunset and sunrise. The court
observed that fearful accidents to ~ersons driving
animals which are frightened into unmanageable terror
by automobiles are of common occurrence. As country
horses are driven into cities and become used to automobiles the danger of their use on country roads will
grow less. The ordinance was held reasonable (Ex
parte Berry, 82 P. 44).
Title 36 of Utah Code Annotated relates to highways. Section 1-28 and 29-30 governs the size and
weight arid dimensions of vehicles including the size
of tires for the weight of the load. Section 33 provides
for special permits for excessive loads and Section 34
p·rovides for restricted use because of climatic conditions, when operation of motor vehicles would damage
the highway. Section 36-1-33 provides for special permits for excessive loads. It would be a strange legal
anomaly if one who owned a home abutting on the
highway could recover da~ages becaus·e of the operation of vehicles under such special permits in the
absence of ,physical damage and upon proof merely
that the excessive loads caused excessive noise and
fumes. There is an inevitable conflict of interest between those who live adjacent to the highways and
those who travel upon them. The court takes judicial
notice of the efforts of public authorities to compose
this conflict. Certain residential areas are given a
reduced speed limit. Certain streets are given one
way traffic and traffic is prohibited on some streets
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at certain hours to permit children to play on them.
Appellant's remedy, if any, is to obtain state or
county or municipal legislation to restore the streets
\Vhich intersect in front of his house to their original
status as country lanes on w~ich the surrey with the
fringe on top lurched through the mud of winter or the
dirt road of summer but was no doubt less frequent
and less noisy than present-day traffic.
Section 57-7-207 of the motor vehicle code :provides:''Every motor vehicle shall at all tim~s be
equipped with a muffler in good working order
and in constant operation to p~revent excessive
or unusual noise and annoying smoke, and no
person shall use a muffler cutout, by-pass or
similar device upon a motor vehicle o~ a highway.''
It will not be disputed that the road commission
could .and would deny the use of the highways to
vehicles which caused ''excessive or unusual' noise
or ''annoying smoke". The fact that resp~ondents were
allowed to operate raises a presumption that their
vehicles did not produce excessive or unusual noise or
annoying smoke.
Section 57-7-113 contains speed restrictions. The
court found respondent's sp·eed was 20 miles per hour
and appellant does not claim in his brief that this
finding is not supported by the evidence. No claim is
made that the sp~eed was excessive.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In 1909 the Supreme Court of Utah decided a
case which is strikingly similar to this one. TwentySecond Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co.,
36 Utah 238, 103 P. 243. The headnotes reflect the
holding of the court.
"The interference with religious services by
the annoyance from the noises in the rightful
operation of a railroad and train yards near a
church, without any physical interference with
the church property, does not .give the religious
society a right of action for damages against the
railroad company, under the provision of Const.
art. I, sec. 22, that 'private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.' ''
''The interference with religious services by
the annoyance from the noises in the rightful
operation of a railroad and train yards near a
church, without 'allY physical interference with
the church property, is not a private nuisance
giving the religious society a cause of action
against the railroad company.''
That case was an action by the Church against
the Railroad, for ·damages ·caused by noise and smoke
from trains interfering with the use of the adjacent
property for religious purposes.
The court held the def.endan t w-as not liable and
said:
''Does the operation of a railroad by passing
of trains whether few or many, when operated
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"~ith

ordinary care, constitute either a public
or a p~ivate nuisance~ Can the noises that
emanate from moving trains be eliminated without preventing the trains from running at all~
Moreover, do not such noises affect all who are
similarly situated along the line of the railroad~
If not in the same degree, do they not affect all
to some extent~ If this be so, how can it be said
that in a legal sense such noises constitute a
nuisance either public or priva.te ~ The Court
of Appeals of New York, in a comparatively
recent case, namely, Bennett v. Long Island R.
Co., 181 N.Y. 431, 74 N.E. 418, in passing upon
this point, uses the following language ~ ' The
rumble of trains, the cl·anging of bells, the shriek
of whistles, the blowing off of steam, the discordant squeak of wheels in going around curves,
the emission of smoke, soot, and cinders, all of
which accompany the operation of steam cars,
are undoubtedly nuisances to the neighboring
dwellings in the 1popular sense; but, as they are
necessarily incident to the maintenance of the
road, they do not constitute nuisances in the
legal sense, but are regarded as protected by
legislative authority which created the corporation and legalized its corporate ·operations. Nor
does the legal nature of such annoy·ances change
as traffic increases them in volume and extent. ' ''

A recent federal court case from the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals is Thompson v. Kimball, 165
F. (2d) 677, decided in 1948. Kimball constructed or
acquired a house in Omaha, Nebraska, adjacent to an
existing railroad track and switch yard of the Missouri
Pacific Railroad operated by Thompson as trustee in
bankruptcy. Kimball alleged and proved that since
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1937 the railroad had put an engine on its track
directly in front of his hous·e four or five times a
da.y for about twenty minutes and during this time
the fireman shook the ashes out of the grates and
built up the fire by adding coal. This process caused
the engine to emit quantities of smoke, soot, cinders
and steam. It was the theory of Kimball's attorney
and the trial court found spotting the engines nearer
to plaintiff's property than was necessary resulted in
an unnecessary nuisance and allowed recovery. The
decision belo'v was reversed. The court held that the
fact that the defendant could stand its engines in front
of another person's house instead of plaintiff's did
not make a private nuisanee and support recovery.
Plaintiff claimed that the recent building of additional
tracks nearer to plaintiff's house cast a new burden
upon his house and premises which did not exist before
that tim·e and that for such added burden he was
entitled to damages. The. court, holding that such
additional us-e and construction was · within the purview of the original location quoted from an earlier
Nebraska case:
'' . . . The evidence shows that within four
years prior to the bringing of this suit the railway company constructed in the street, opposite
the 0 'Connor property, an additional side track
for use in connection with its coal house. This
dd not confer upon O'Connor 'any cause of action
against the railway company. If a railway company condemns real estate for the erection thereon of a road, and builds one track thereon, then
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
we are of the opinion that the building of one
or more additional tracks on the same right of
way, and on the same ·profile or grade, that such
additional tracks should be construed to be within the purview and purposes of the original condemnation. ''
and said:
''The court also stated that all elements of
damage to property by reason of building a railroad in front of it and its continuous and proper
operation must be included in the original settlement of damages; that it is common knowledge
that a railway cannot be operated without smoke
and soot; and that these things are within the
realm of what would probobly result from the
proper and ordinary operation of the railway as
constructed and are a p;art of the damages ~rop
erly sustained by the original location and use of
the railway.''
The parallel between the case at bar and the federal
court case is obvious. When Mr. Coon built his house
at the intersection of 33rd South and 80th West he
wanted the convenience of living on two public highways. He must accept th,at convenience burdened with
the common knowledge that highways carry traffic
which makes noise and dust and fumes when operated
in the normal ordinary manner. The original location
of the highways whether by condemnation or grant
result·ed in Mr. Coon or his predecessor in the title
being paid for all elements of damage to the p·roperty,
past and future.
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Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne, 186 P. (2d) 556.
The City of Cheyenne, located in the midst of nothing
but room, is a bottleneck for traffic. The city 'Passed
an ordinance requiring all commercial motor carriers
passing through the city to follow a specified through
route. The suit was by an owner of residence property
abutting the truck route for himself and all others
sintilarly situated to enjoin the enforcement of the
ordinance. It was alleged and proved that the trucks
made dust, noise, fumes and traffic hazards-that much
of the area is residential and zoned as to kind and
cost of buildings to be erected thereon. The ordinance
made it mandatory for trucks passing through the
city to take the specified route passing plaintiffs' houses.
The court in an exhaustive opinion written by Judge
Blume held the ordinance valid and within the powers
granted by the Constitution and statutes of Wyoming.
The discussion which is in point on the issues in the
case at bar is found in subheads 22 to 25, inclusive,
beginning at page 570. The court held that the plaintiffs had no rights which were infringed by the enforcement of this ordinance. Admitting that motor vehicles
create nois-e and dust and fumes and vibration which
did not exist in the same volume before the ordinance
was ,pas,sed, the use of the highway was legal and
plaintiff had no right to the abs-ence of heavy traffic.
The case is so clearly parallel to this one that we quote
at length from the well reasoned opinion :
''The streets, as the petition shows have been
dedicated to the public. The auth~rities are
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unanimous in holding that streets are dedicated
or other,Yise established primarily for the public
who haYe a common right to the use thereof,
and 'vho n1ay make such use thereof by all the
usual modes of travel thereon, including by
vehicles which advancing civilization may find
convenient ·and proper. Abutting property owners
haYe no greater rights therein and thereto than
the public generally, except only that they have
the additional right of ingress and egress and
of a few other analogous rights such as light
and air. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Company v. West Chicago Street Railroad Company, 156 lll. 255, 40 N.E. 1008, 29 L.R.A. 485;
State ex rei. State B;ighway Commission v. Cox,
336 Mo. 271, 77 S.W. 2d 116; City of Elmhurst
v. Buettgen, 394 Ill. 248, 68 N .E. 2d 278, 281;
Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579,
71 A.L.R. 604; 25 Am. Jur. 434, 448-455, 456-459,
Dillon, MuniciJ>al Corporations, 5th Ed., Sec.
1248; 40 C.J.S., Highways, Sec. 233. 'Dedication
or condemnation of a street,' . it has been said,
'contemplates the most onerous and injurious
mode of use to which it can be lawfully devoted.'
Foster's, Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118
P. 2d 721, 726. Plaintiffs bought and improved
their property with the knowledge of these facts
and their erroneous belief that no change· in
conditions would ensue is one that has not been
uncommon in growing communities, but for which
there is ordinarily no remedy in the courts. See
3-4 Huddy Cyciopedia of Automobile L·aw, 9th
Ed., Sec. 2. Plaintiffs seek, in effect, to enjoin
commercial through truckers from using the
streets designated by the ordinance in question,
though, it is true, they attempt to do so by
indirection. But these truckers travel by a mode
vvhich is usual and accepted, and they are free
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to use the streets above mentioned. If they can
be kept off these streets, it can only be done by
a regulation of the municipal authorities which
represent the public. Plaintiffs claim in their
petition, their argument in this court, and inferentially by their testimony, that such use by the
truckers constitutes a nuisance. That contention
finds no support· whatever in any of the auhorities. If, in the absence of the ordinance in question, truckers should voluntarily choose to use
the route now designated by the ordinance, the
abutting :property owners would not, under the
foregoing rules, have any remedy whatever. And
the evidence in the case shows that many of them
in fact choose to use it. If, in the absence of
such ordinance, the truckers should use the route
so designated pursuant to the mere advice of
the city authorities the result would, we think,
be the same. The mere direction of the city
authorities that truckers shall use the designated
streets in the ordinance cannot create a nuisance
if no nuisance in fact existed without such direction. The privilege of truckers to use the routes
de signa ted by the ordinance is clearly inconsistent with the claim that the use by them of these
routes constitutes a public or a private nuisance. See Elliott on Roads and Streets, 4th
Ed., Sec. 1108; 1-2 Huddy, supra, Sec. 44. If
it were such nuisance, it would be equally so
when traveling along Central Avenue and the
Lincoln Highway, and in such case the city
should prohibit the use of all of the streets by
them entirely. That that cannot be done is recognized even by counsel for the plaintiffs himself.
The ere a tion of noise, dust, dirt and danger to
children by such trucks cannot be denied. These
evils would be equally bad on almost any of
the streets. They are unfortunate concomitants
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of adYancing civilization. Society V{ould raise a
loud cry to Heaven if any legislative body should
attempt to forbid their use. In Roebling v. Trenton Pass. Ry. Co., 58 N.J.L. 666, 674, 34 A. 1090,
1093, 33 L.R....\. 129, the court stated: 'The
owner of lands abutting a street holds his title
subject to the inconveniences and injurious consequences, including those occasioned by noise
and vibration, resulting from a user which is
consistent with the legitimate and proper use to
which these public thoroughfares are devoted.'
In Cadwell v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co.,
84 Conn. 450, 80 A. 285, 287, the court, speaking
of a street railway, stated:
"It is bound to conduct its business with a
reasonable regard under the circumstances for
the rights of others. This does not, however, signify that every annoyance, inconvenience or
feature, which might be regarded as objectionable,
and to which damage might be traced, attending
the construction or operation of 'a street railway
furnishes the foundation of an action.
"Certain. unpleasant, inconvenient, and disturbing features, from the point of view of an
adjoining owner; naturally attend public travel
upon a highway, if there is any considerable
amount of it. This is distinctly true of highway
use by street cars, and the greater the public
demand and service, the greater these features
ralmost certainly are. Dust cannot well he kept
down, and vibration and noise in some measure
is inevitable. Such things as these and other
annoyances and-inconveniences which result from
a user of a highway which is consistent with a
legitimate and proper use of it as :a public thoroughfare are among the penalties which a modern and busy life imposes up.on those who come
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closest in contact with it. A user of a highway
by a street railway forms no exception. ·Certain
objectionable results ·are among its natural incidents. In so far as this is the case, and the
consequences complained of flovv naturally and
normally from the conduct of the traffic under
·proper authority, in a reasonable manner and
\vith due regard for the rights of others, one
\vho conceives that he has been injured can have
no redress.''
''The case is cited with approval in Nuttle
v. 'Vichita R. & Light Co., 123 Kan. 517, 256 P.
128, "'here a number of similar or analogous cases
are cited. To the same effect also see State v.
Hartford St. Ry. Co., 76 ·Conn. i 74, 56 A. 506.
That the principle involved in these cases and
in the case at bar is the same is clear.
''We should, finally, inquire whether an additional servitude has been imposed upon the
streets by the ordinance in question to which
the abutting property owners can object. The
precise question is as to whether or not the
artificial increase of travel thereon by trucks
which may be caused by the ordinance, is such
additional servitude. There is no direct authority on the point. This is the first case on record, so far as we know, in which abutting property owners have objected to a regulation similar to that in this case. Many analogous cases
have held in the negative. It is almost universally held that the. use of streets by street
railWiays pursuant to a franchise is not an additional burden for which abutting property owners are entitled to compensation, and to which,
accordingly they cannot object. Elliott, Roads
and Streets, 4th Ed., Sec. 886; McQuillin, supra,
Sec. 1843; see 44 C.J. 986. In Kipp v. DavisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Daly Cooper Company, 41 I\font. 509, 110 P.
237, 240, 36 L.R.A., N.S., 666, :21 Ann. Cas.
137:2, the plaintiffs, abutting property owners,
brought suit to enjoin the defendant from constructing a street railway along their street,
pursuant to a franchise. The court held that
plaintiffs had no cause of action, and were not
entitled to any compensation by reason of such
construction. The fee of the street was vested
in the city, as the fee of the streets is vested
in the City of Cheyenne, pursuant to Sec.
29-1209, \""\Tyo. Compiled Statutes of 1945. The
court, among other things, said: 'But it is
not important to inquire where the fee is vested.
The respective rights of the abutting owner
and the public are dependant upon the fact
of dedication. In view of these i>rovisions as
well as of the rule of law recognized everywhere, the authorities which control streets
and highways may use or permit the use · of
them in any manner or for any purpose which
is reasonably incident to the appropriation of
them to public travel and to the ordinary uses
of streets or highways under the different conditions which arise from time to time. White
v. Blanchard Bros. (Granite Co.), 178 Mass.
363, 59 N.E. 1025. For a highway is created
for the use of the public, not only in view
of its necessities and requirements as they
exist, but also in view of the constantly changing modes and conditions of travel and transportation, brought about by improved methods
and required by the increase of population and
the exp.ansion in the volume of traffic due
to the ever-increasing needs · of society. Were
this not so, any change in these resp·ects would
require a readjustment of rights as between
the vublic and the abutting property owner,
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because the result of it would- of necessity
be held an imposition of a new burden upon
the highway, and hence upon the property of
the abutting owner.' If abutting property owners cannot object in such a case, it is difficult
to see how they can object in a case such as
is before us. If there is any difference,- it is
merely one of degree, not of kind. There
is one distinction. The rights or privileges of
truckers to the use of streets are greater than
those of the operators of a street railway. The
latter need a franchise, the former do not.
The difference in effect, if any, would be to
strengthen our conclusion herein, rather than
to weaken it.''
The Utah case, Twenty-Second Ward v. Oregon
Short Line Railroad (supra), holding a railroad is not
liable for the annoyance- resulting to adjoining property owners from its non-negligent operation, is in
line with the authorities which seem to be uniform.
The rhird Circuit Court of Appeals in 1913 decided
Roman Catholic Church v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 207 F.
897. The holding is reflected in the headnotes:
''The consequential, incidental, and unavoidable annoyance or damage resulting to the occupiers of land adjacent to a duly authorized
railroad from its nonnegligent and careful operation does not constitute an 'actionable nuisance,' irrespective of the extent of such
annoyance or damage.''
''Nor does the ·causing of such damage to
the :property owner by such nonnegligent opeflaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion of the railroad constitute a taking or
appropriation of his property 'vithout due
process of law·, or just co1npensation, in violation of the Constitution of the United States."
(B)

APPELLANTS FAILED TO PROVE ANY DAMAGE.

The appellent Coon did not prove any damage
by reason of the operation of respondent's trucks. The

measure of damages is the depreciation of the market
value of the property affected. This rule i~s announced
in Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 137
P. (2d) 347, 104 U. 221.
"The measure of damages for the maintenance of a recurrent nuisance is the depreciation of market value of the property · affected.
Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., supra.
The same measure of damages ~applies to
permanent uninterrupted nuisances. See Lewis
v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P.
558, L.R.A. 1916C, 1260. It appears to be the
view of appellant that the rule of diminution
of market value was not pro~erly applied. It
is claimed that witness·es for plaintiffs made
valuations from which they computed depreciation o·n some theory of absence of the plant
structure and without reference to other existing industries, activities and facilities. However, at least one witness indicated he· took
into consideration .the surrounding conditions,
and he based depreciation solely on the odors
emanating from defendant's plant. It appears
that the trial court based depreciation on the
frequent recurrence of stench, not on ~any
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assumption that the building and other physical structures of appellant as located consti- ·
tuted a nuisance. The findings and conclusions
of the ·court indicate that in assessing damages
the tr]al judge used the vroper criterion-the
difference in market value of each tract with
its improvements without the stench nuisance
existing, as compared with_the value as affected
by such odors.''
·
The record contains no testimony upon which
the court could find depreciation in market value.
Appellant's cases support the general proposition
that noise and vibration under certain facts and circumstances may be actionable either by injunction or
an action for damages.
The Utah case of Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 71

U. 1, 262 P. 269, cited by appellants, was the case in
which a judgment for da1nages for plaintiff resulting
fron1 fumes and odors was reversed. The last paragraph of the opinion contains language' which seems
to be against the appellants in this case.
''In applying the foregoing legal principles
to the case at bar we must take into consideration the facts as 'shown by the uncontradict~d
evidence that the defendant's oil refinery IS
lawful, useful, and necessary business, and is
s_ituated in the_ industrial_ or. manuftacturing section of the ·city; that It lS a modern wellequipp·ed planl and. is conducted in a ~areful
manner and- accordmg to approved methods;
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that it is not in close proximity to the plaintiff's house but at a substantial distance (1,000
feet or more) therefrom. There is no claim
that the defendant, by any careless or extraordinary or unnecessary use of its property,
produces the injury complained of. The sole
ground of complaint is that offensive and disagreeable fumes or odors emanrate from the
refinery and are carried through the air to
the plaintiff's house. It is admitted that the
odors are not constant and are not injurious
to life or health, and it is obvious th:at they
cause no direct or physical injury to property.
The extent of the offense claimed is that the
odors are disagreeable and unpleasant and have
at times wakened persons sleeping in plaintiff's house ·and required them to shut doors
and windows. In these circumstances we are
unable to say as a matter of law that a case
of unreasonable use or actionable nuisance was
made out. See Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co.,
supra; Petroleum Refining Co. v. Commonwealth, 192 Ky. 272, 232 S.W. 421. No p-recedent for sustaining liability under similar circumstances has been cited, and we have found
none. The essential facts with res:.pect to the
nature, locality, and manner of use of defendant's plant, and the situation with reference
thereto of the plaintiff's house, and the degree
and extent of the plaintiff's annoyance and
discomfort, are so clear that the question presented is one of law. We therefore ·conclude
that the trial court erred in not directing a
verdict for defendant and in denying defendant's motion for a new trial.''
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·The appellants cite another Utah case, Lewis v.
Pingree National Bank, 47 U. 35, 151 P. 558. In thai
case the defendant constructed a bank building so that
it occupied a portion of the public street (Washington
. Avenue). An injunction was denied and the_ adjoining
prqperty owner was allowed to p·rove his damages on
a retrial of the case. It gives no support to the contentions of the appellants in the c31se at bar.

CONCLUSION
It is reS!pectfully submitted that the appellants
failed to follow the method prescribed. by the Utah
Statutes or the newly adopted rules of procedure in
preparing the record on appeal and the transcript of
record should be stricken and the judgment affirmed
because the merits of the case are not properly before the court. If respond.ent is overruled in this contention we submit that appellants have failed to show
any cause of action and have failed to show any damage or depreciation in the value of their ~·roperty by
reason of respondent's operations.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
Attorneys for Resp,ondent.
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APPENDIX ''A''
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MAUD D. COON and JOSEPH COON,
husband and wife,

Appellants,
Case No. 7470
MOTION

vs.

UTAH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a corporation,
Respondent.
--0--

Comes now the respondent, Utah Construction Company, and moves the court for an order striking the
transcript of official proceedings and evidence, including exhibits, on file herein, on the ground and for the
reason that said transcript and exhibits are not legally
and properly a part of the recond on appeal herein.
This motion is based uv·on the files and records
in the above named case.

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
jsj A. H. Nebeker
Attorneys for Resp_,ondent.
Received copy of the foregoing motion this 20th
day of September, 1950.
jsj E. LeRoy Shields

Attorney for Appellants.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

46

CERTIFICATE OF MERIT
A. H. Nebeker hereby certifi.eJs: That I have prepared the foregoing motion to .strike the transcript of
official record and have examined the facts and the
law relating thereto and in my opinion the motion is
well founded and is not interposed for delay.
·Dated this 12th day of September, 1950.
jsj A. H. Nebeker
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